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Ariel Dinar, Javier Ortiz Correa, Stefano Farolfi, Joao Mutondo 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the decentralization processes and performances of river basin management 
decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa, using primary data from 27 river basins in the region. 
The main findings are that water scarcity is a major stimulus to reform; that water user 
associations, if not well prepared and trained, may deter the decentralization process; and being 
part of an existing treaty over an international basin helps foster the process. Conditions 
improving decentralization performance include: scarcity of water resources, longer period of 
implementation, bottom-up creation, and appropriate budgetary support of the river basin 
organization. Findings are relevant for policy in decentralization in remaining river basins across 
the continent and elsewhere, suggesting important central government interventions and an 
implementation sequence that would lead to more effective results. 
Key words: decentralization, political economy, economic efficiency, institutions, water, river 
basin, IWRM Sub-Saharan Africa. 
JEL Codes: Q25, Q34 
1. Introduction 
In a recent initiative, the World Bank suggests that “More irrigation and pastoralism could 
transform Africa’s Sahel region” (World Bank 2013). The Sahel, linking Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal in a harsh water situation, is home to pastoralist agriculture 
that faces water scarcity threats. According to the World Bank vision, bringing more water to the 
Sahel will help address food security, allow farmers to move from subsistence to commercialized 
farming with its indirect positive impacts on local and regional markets, as well as to “protect 
biodiversity, improve soil fertility, and conserve the environment” (World Bank 2013). 
This vision, while focused on the Sahel, is attractive also for any other part of Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) but raises several challenges and concerns. These challenges include not 
only the hardware for moving and distributing water from water bodies to the demand sites, but 
also the software: the institutions that will allow such great plans to be realized. The latter 
challenge is the more difficult one to address, and it is the focus of this paper. 
In response to global water scarcity, river basins in Sub-Saharan Africa have undergone, 
to various extents, decentralization of water management in the past two decades. Most SSA 
countries established their water laws in the past 15 years and restructured their institutional and 
governance framework accordingly. For example, South Africa voted its National Water Act in 
1998 and its National Water Resources Strategy in 2002; Zambia amended in 1994 its Water Act 
of 1970, while Mozambique and Tanzania approved their National Water Policies respectively in 
1995 and in 2002, and Namibia voted its Water Resource Management Act in 2004.  
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As relatively late-comers to the decentralization arena following the Dublin Conference 
(GWP 2000)
2
, SSA countries could have benefitted from previous experiences. However, 
specific and partial analyses of performance of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
in SSA river basins (at the case study level with different measurement methodologies) have 
suggested (e.g., Gallego-Ayala and Juizo 2012; Juizo et al. 2006) a wide range of performances 
in the various basins across the continent. This raises questions about the validity of the 
measurements and their comparability across basins, as well as their relevance. 
While much effort and good will was put into decentralization reforms in many basins in 
the continent, results have not been uniformly realized. For example, the benefits originated from 
the implementation of such decentralization processes were taken for granted during the design 
of the South Africa National Water Act. The decentralization process addressed 19 basins in the 
country, indicating that it was a major effort. However, slow and uneven implementation of the 
decentralization process led to unrealized benefits. Ten years after the launch of the new national 
water policy, only two catchment management agencies have been established and are 
operational (Inkomati and Olifants-Doorns), while more locally many water user associations 
(WUAs) do not function properly and the catchment management committees (CMCs) have not 
given decisional power (Karar 2011).  
In some other SSA countries, the process of decentralization in the basin water 
management institutions could have been more or less advanced than in South Africa, as we can 
see from analyzing the data collected in the study leading to this paper. Therefore, the a-priori set 
of basins in SSA countries provides a range of decentralization efforts and performances, and 
allows us to apply our proposed methodology of decentralization analysis. 
In this paper, we address the broader question of decentralization of river basin water 
management, of which IWRM is an important component. An early global study on the 
determinants and performances of decentralization processes in river basins (Dinar et al. 2007; 
Kemper et al. 2007; Blomquist et al. 2010) did not include basins from SSA, mainly because the 
decentralization process just started at the time their study was conducted. Our study of 
decentralization in SSA departs from Dinar et al. (2007) and Blomquist et al. (2010) with several 
adjustments to the empirical analysis, forced on us due to the quality of the data we were able to 
obtain from SSA basins. Since we use the same theory as in Dinar et al. (2007) and Blomquist 
(2010), we will not discuss the analytical framework and hypotheses in detail in section 2, but 
rather refer the reader to the references above. Section 3 describes the data collection and 
variables construction methods we used. Section 4 presents the components of the empirical 
analysis we applied. Section 5 presents and discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes and 
addresses some policy implications. 
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 For more information on decentralization principles see Dinar et al. (2007:852-853). 
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2. Analytical framework and hypotheses 
We follow the analytical framework suggested by Blomquist et al. (2010). The framework 
identifies and focuses primarily upon four sets of observable variables and suggests hypotheses 
about the directions by which those sets of variables are associated with the possible success of 
decentralization of water resource management reforms. 
These sets include: (1) Initial conditions and contextual factors; (2) Characteristics of the 
decentralization process; (3) Central government-local relationships and capacities; and (4) 
Resource-level institutional arrangements. All these four sets of variables jointly provide 
incentives and enable the stakeholders’ participation in the decentralization. Such involvement is 
linked to better management decisions that, in turn, lead to increased likelihood of improved 
resource management.  
This framework has already been applied to assess and compare the relative degrees of 
success and failure of decentralization reforms in river basin management, not including SSA 
(Kemper et al. 2006; Dinar et al. 2007). We apply the framework in this paper to decentralization 
in SSA river basins, using a subset of the variables presented in Dinar et al. (2007). 
2.1 The hypotheses 
For each of the four sets we developed a list of empirical variables that were included in a 
questionnaire that was supposed to elicit responses from the river basins organizations (RBOs) in 
SSA. The empirical variables that we refer to in the next sections are discussed below. 
2.1.1 Impact of contextual factors and initial conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that the outcome of 
decentralization is partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the time a 
decentralization initiative is attempted (path dependency). These initial conditions are elements 
of the economic, political, and social context of the decentralization effort. Several variables that 
could capture such conditions are detailed below. 
Level of economic development of the river basin region measures the ability of the basin 
stakeholders to commit financial and other resources necessary to the decentralization process in 
addition to central government provision of support for the decentralization effort. The literature 
on decentralized water resource management indicates that successful decentralization must 
include some degree of financial autonomy (Cerniglia 2003; Musgrave 1997). Sustaining this 
financial autonomy often depends upon the establishment of some form of water pricing or 
tariffs, having the users obeying such payments, and having the proceeds remain within or 
returned to the basin. 
Thus, decentralizing management to the basin level, developing and maintaining the 
institutional arrangements for basin-level management, and implementing any form of financial 
autonomy imply that some financial resources at the basin level will have to be committed to the 
decentralization effort. This in turn implies that basins that have a level of economic 
development that can sustain those resource commitments are (all other things being equal) 
more likely to achieve sustainable success in decentralization. 
Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders is an important contextual factor in the 
development and successful implementation of a decentralization initiative. We also refer to the 
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impact of climate change on the variability of water flows in the basin as a measure of resource 
availability. This variable has interesting and complex properties, however. On the one hand and 
more obviously, extreme disparities in resource endowments among basin stakeholders can 
imperil decentralization success. If some privileged stakeholders anticipate they would be worse 
off, they are unlikely to support the decentralization process and may even try to derail it. And if 
other stakeholders are so destitute as to be unable to bring any resources of their own to the 
decentralization initiative, they may rationally elect not to participate even though more effective 
resource management would promise to improve their situation in the long run. On the other 
hand and less obviously, some inequality of initial resource endowments may facilitate action by 
enabling some stakeholders to bear the costs of taking a leadership role (Ostrom 1990). 
Thus, some inequality of resource endowments is not necessarily lethal to a 
decentralization initiative, and may even facilitate it if better-situated users are willing to lead 
(Dinar 2009). Extreme inequality, however, may be detrimental or even derail the 
decentralization effort. The distribution of resource endowments among the basin stakeholders is 
therefore an important contextual variable affecting the prospects for successful decentralization. 
We hypothesize that the relationship between level of inequality of resource endowments and 
successful decentralization is quadratic, with the greatest positive impact at a certain level of 
inequality, and lower or negative impacts at both lower and higher levels of inequality of 
resource endowment distribution. 
2.1.2 Characteristics of the decentralization process 
Certain conditions or characteristics of the decentralization process itself may affect the 
prospects for successful implementation. Two necessary conditions of a decentralization 
initiative are (a) a devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) an 
acceptance of that authority and responsibility by the local or regional units. Whether (a) and (b) 
both occur will depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes place. 
Top-down, bottom-up, or mutually desired devolution are ways of characterizing the 
decentralization initiative. In some cases, central government officials may have undertaken 
resource management decentralization initiatives in order to solve their own problems – e.g., to 
reduce or eliminate the central government’s political accountability for past or current resource 
policy failures, resolve a budgetary crisis by cutting their financial responsibility for selected 
domestic policy areas (Simon 2002), or respond to pressure from external support agencies to 
formulate a decentralization initiative as a condition of continued receipt of financial support. In 
other cases it is “bottom up” pressure from the stakeholders that leads to the decentralization 
(Samad 2005). In other cases, the decision to decentralize resource management to a lower and 
more appropriate level may have been the outcome of a process of mutual discussion and 
agreement between central officials hoping to improve policy outcomes and local stakeholders 
desiring greater autonomy and/or flexibility. 
Using the data collected, we therefore attempt to identify the motivation and process by 
which the decentralization initiative came to pass. All other things being equal, we can anticipate 
that because decentralization initiatives require active basin-level stakeholder involvement, they 
are more likely to be implemented successfully if undertaken under the latter (bottom-up) 
circumstances than under the former (top-down). 
Existing local-level governance arrangements contribute to continuation. The literature suggests 
that decentralization initiatives are more likely to be accompanied by active involvement of basin 
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stakeholders if existing community (village, tribe) governance institutions and practices are 
recognized and incorporated in the decentralization process. This observation has a transactions 
costs explanation, too: the costs (primarily in terms of time and effort) to basin stakeholders of 
relating on familiar organizational forms are expected to be smaller than the costs of relating to 
an additional set of organizational arrangements. In contrast, decentralization initiatives that 
feature central government construction of new sets of basin-level organizations that are largely 
separate from existing and traditional community governance institutions may face higher costs 
in achieving basin stakeholders’ participation, resource commitments, and acceptance of 
decisions as legitimate. This does not mean that no new institutions will have to be created in 
order to achieve basin-scale management – in fact, new institutions will be needed to promote 
communication and integrate decision-making across communities within a river basin. Rather, 
all other things being equal, decentralization initiatives are more likely to succeed in gaining 
stakeholder acceptance if they are based upon, and constructed from, traditional community 
governance institutions and practices (i.e. take account of existing social capital). 
2.1.3 Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central government 
and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be expected to affect that 
success. Accordingly, our study includes a set of political and institutional variables having to do 
with the respective capacities of the central government and the basin-level stakeholders, and the 
relationship between them. 
The extent of devolution of responsibilities and decision-making. A decentralization policy 
initiative announced by a central government may be only symbolic, while the central 
government retains in practice control over all significant resource management decisions. 
Worse still, a decentralization policy can represent an abandonment of central government 
responsibility for resource management without a concomitant establishment of local-level 
authority. In better situations, the central government transfers degrees of both authority and 
responsibility for resource management to the stakeholders. 
These differences in the extent of actual devolution that occurs can be expected to affect 
the prospects for successful implementation of the decentralization policy. Symbolic or 
abandonment policies are at best unlikely to improve resource management, and at worst will 
undermine stakeholder willingness to commit to and sustain the extent of active involvement 
necessary for successful decentralization. All other things being equal, we would expect to see 
greater prospects for success increasing with level of devolution. 
Local-level experience with self-governance and service provision. In any country, the 
decentralization of water resource management does not occur in a vacuum. The ability of 
central government officials to strike a balance between supportiveness and intrusiveness, and 
the capacity of basin-level stakeholders to organize and sustain institutional arrangements, will in 
part be a function of their experiences with respect to other public services or responsibilities. 
The ability of central and local participants to perform successfully will depend on the skills and 
experiences they have developed. 
We would expect that water resource management decentralization initiatives are more 
likely to be implemented successfully in settings where local participants have experience in 
governing and managing other resources and/or public services – e.g., land uses, schooling, 
transportation, etc.  
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Economic, political, and social differences among basin users. In many countries, the distribution 
of political influence will be a function of economic, religious, or other social and cultural 
distinctions. But even if it were not for the connection between these characteristics and political 
influence, the characteristics themselves can affect successful implementation of decentralization 
initiatives, through their independent effects on stakeholder communication, trust, and extent of 
experience in interdependent endeavors.  
Economic, political, and social distinctions among basin-level stakeholders are likely to 
affect the implementation of decentralized resource management efforts. The greater and more 
contentious these distinctions, all other things being equal, the more difficult it will be to develop 
and sustain basin-scale institutional arrangements for governing and managing water resources.  
It is important to add that these are empirical, not prescriptive, observations. Central government 
officials cannot make distinctions among basin-level stakeholders disappear. Nor should central 
government officials selectively apply decentralization policies only in relatively homogeneous 
settings.  
Adequate time for implementation and adaptation. While it is obvious that longevity of water 
resource management arrangements may reflect their success, it may be less obvious that their 
success may depend on their longevity. Time is needed to develop basin-scale institutional 
arrangements, to experiment with alternatives and engage in some trial-and-error learning. Time 
is needed for trust building, so water users can begin to accept new arrangements and gradually 
commit to sustaining them. Time is needed also to translate resource management plans into 
observable and sustained effects on resource conditions.  
The relationship between time and success in water resource management is complicated. 
On the one hand, we have already said that adaptability is important, as water users need to be 
able to modify institutional arrangements in response to changed conditions. On the other hand, 
patience is important too, because a new approach that has not succeeded can simply erode 
stakeholders’ willingness to commit their time and effort to the next reform. We may observe a 
curvilinear relationship, in which successful implementation is less likely to be observed among 
decentralization initiatives that are very young, but could taper off if central government and 
basin-level arrangements have proved insufficiently adaptable over long periods. 
2.1.4 The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management may also depend on 
features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or by the central 
government.  
Presence of basin-level governance institutions may be a prerequisite for successful water 
resource management. Sustained and effective participation of stakeholders presupposes the 
existence of arrangements by which stakeholders articulate their interests, share information, 
communicate and bargain, and take collective decisions. Basin-level governance is essential to 
the ability of water users to operate at multiple levels of action, which is a key to sustained 
successful resource preservation and efficient use (Ostrom 1990). 
Basin-level water resource management (in other words, a decentralized system) is 
neither achievable nor sustainable without the establishment and maintenance of basin-level 
governance arrangements. In the case of SSA, we refer also to situations of rivers that are 
international in nature. Thus having an agreed upon treaty among the various riparians would 
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also fall under this category of sub-basin interests. Because the existence of governance 
arrangements is a necessary, not sufficient, condition of successful resource management, we 
should not expect to find success everywhere we find basin-level governance institutions, but we 
should expect to find failure everywhere they are absent. 
Recognition of sub-basin communities of interest. The water management issues in the basin are 
viewed differently by the stakeholders that share the resource in various parts of the basin, based 
mainly on the physical conditions and spatial situation of each group. For example, downstream 
users’ perspectives on water quality differ from upstream users. Users with access to 
groundwater have different views of drought exposure than surface water users. Municipal and 
industrial water users do not perceive the value of assured water supply reliability in the same 
fashion that agricultural water users do (Blomquist and Schlager 1999). Thus, while basin-level 
governance and management arrangements are essential to decentralized water resource 
management, the ability of sub-basin stakeholders to address sub-basin issues may be as 
important. In the case of SSA, we refer also to situations of rivers that are international in nature. 
Thus, having an agreed upon treaty among the various riparians would also fall under this 
category of sub-basin interests. 
Level of participation of various groups in basin-level decision-making arrangements 
explains the direction and extent of the decentralization process. Of course, transaction costs of 
the decentralization process increase as such assurances are institutionalized, since a larger 
number of stakeholder organizations within the basin will bring greater coordination costs. All 
other things being equal, we would expect that successful implementation of basin 
decentralization has a positive relationship with level of participation of stakeholders in the 
process. However, with a diverse and large number of stakeholders, high transaction costs may 
become a constraint. Here too, then, a hill-shaped relation of this variable to successful 
decentralization may be expected, with the absence of sub-basin organizations and large 
numbers of sub-basin organizations negatively associated with lower success and greater 
prospects for success in between. 
Information sharing and communication. The importance of information – more particularly, 
information symmetry – and opportunities for communication to the emergence and maintenance 
of cooperative decision-making is relatively well understood. In water resource management 
especially, of which there can be so many indicators of water resource conditions and the 
performance of management efforts, forums for information sharing are vital to reducing 
information asymmetries and promoting cooperation. 
Since information will not automatically be perceived the same way by all stakeholders, 
and the implications of information about resource conditions will differ among these groups, it 
is arguably as important that there also be institutionalized or other regular forums in which 
basin stakeholders can communicate. All other things being equal, we expect to find successful 
decentralized water resource management more likely where information sharing and 
communication among stakeholders are more apparent. 
Mechanisms for conflict resolution are needed to prevent disagreements from arising. Resource 
users can and will disagree about how well their interests are being represented and protected, 
about how well the resource management program is working and whether it is time for a 
change, about the distribution of benefits and costs, and manifold other issues.  
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The success and sustainability of decentralized resource management efforts therefore 
also depend on the presence of forums for addressing conflicts. All other things being equal, we 
would expect successful implementation of decentralized water resource management more 
likely in settings where forums for conflict resolution exist. 
The set of variables and their hypothesized impact on the process and performance of the 
decentralization in river basin management, as was developed in this section, will be inferred by 
applying several statistical tests to data collected from 27 river basins around SSA countries. The 
data collection process and the manipulation of the workable variables are presented in the next 
sections. 
3. Data and variable construction 
A survey instrument in Dinar et al. (2005) was modified to collect the data needed for estimating 
the model equations in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was first pre-tested on three river basin 
organizations (RBOs) prior to being modified, translated from English to French and Portuguese, 
and sent to the identified offices of the RBOs in the various states. A total of 27 RBOs in SSA 
known to have undergone decentralization to various extents are included in the final dataset we 
analyze. The English version of the survey instrument can be found in Mutondo, Farolfi and 
Dinar (2014: Annex IV).  
3.1. Data collection methodology 
Data collection was undertaken by PEGASYS, a consulting firm in South Africa with widely 
established contacts with water sector agencies in SSA countries. Data collection was completed 
after several iterative processes of data entry and quality assurance reviews by the authors. 
Additional rudimentary statistical tests were undertaken to identify, verify, and correct outliers in 
the dataset. The questionnaires were completed by staff from the basin organizations. All 
questions, especially those related to performance of the decentralization reform, required 
objective rather than subjective answers. We intentionally approached local authorities following 
the reasoning suggested by Alderman (2002), who observed that local authorities appear to have 
access to information that is not easily captured in official census datasets.  
3.1.1 The potential final set of basins included in the study 
The basis for the identification of the potential RBOs in SSA was ANBO, AMCOW, and GTZ 
(2012), which provided a list of 99 basins in Eastern, Western, Southern, and Central Africa 
(Table 1).  
This list of basins was assessed by PEGASYS and revised, based on a set of investigation 
approaches such as establishing contacts with local NGOs, regional agencies, and known water 
projects. This process yielded a much more detailed list of 121 basins and their decentralization 
status (Table 2). As can be seen from Table 2, of the 121 basins, 29 have not started any 
decentralization activity, and the status of decentralization in 26 other basins was impossible to 
verify. This left us with 66 basins that went through decentralization or that have not yet 
completed the decentralization process. Our final sample of 27 basins shows that we obtained a 
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41 percent response rate. While this response rate is considered barely acceptable in any other 
place on earth, it is quite significant in SSA.
3
  
A description of the 27 basins, the country they belong to, and their status of 
decentralization are presented in Table 3. The list of the 27 RBOs can be found in Annex 1. 
3.1.2 The administration of the questionnaires 
For the 66 basins to whom questionnaires were distributed, the strategy for eliciting responses 
included: introductory emails followed up by phone calls to identify a focal person; shipment of 
the questionnaire by email; follow-up on progress by email as well as phone; clarification 
sessions with some respondents about difficult questions; review of the received questionnaires 
and follow-up on particular responses as needed; translation of the questionnaire into an 
electronic dataset in Excel. The data collection work was planned for six months (March 2012–
September 2012), but actually lasted much longer (March 2012–September 2013) due to 
communication difficulties that PEGASYS encountered with the respondents. 
3.1.3 Quality assurance procedures 
The electronic dataset was shared with the researchers as it was established over time. Overall, 
the research team provided five rounds of feedback to PEGASYS. Feedback included 
inconsistencies in recording missing values (99999) and 0 values, replacement of string values 
with numerical values, and correction of some basic physical information of the basin. Once 
these inaccuracies have been addressed, the dataset was considered complete, even though some 
variables have not been filled.  
Questionnaires in English were translated to French and Portuguese in order to make sure 
they were accessible and understood perfectly by all surveyed RBOs in Africa. In order to 
increase the response rate, a follow-up survey was sent to the respondents if they did not respond 
to the survey within a month, and then continued by a telephone follow-up, if necessary. To 
ensure the highest possible quality, the research team constituted an iterative process of data 
acquisition and quality assurance reviews. The process involved the compilation of qualitative 
and quantitative data from a questionnaire, which the agency that collects the data, PEGASYS, 
distributed. 
All responses were checked both by PEGASYS and a graduate student at University of 
California, Riverside (UCR), under the supervision of the principal investigators, for errors that 
could be critical to the study, such as missing answers to questions, or which respondents for one 
reason or another did not, or could not, answer. In addition to such a check, a further rudimentary 
statistical test was conducted on most variables, to identify outliers within the given response 
range and to ensure that values are justified. In all cases, the seemingly errors were brought to 
the attention of the respondents and, in the case of actual errors and/or mistakes, efforts were 
made towards correction. 
3.2 Variables construction 
Our questionnaire consisted of 56 primary questions and 245 primary variables (see Annex 2 and 
Mutondo et al. 2014). Some of the variables in our data set are naturally correlated to each other. 
                                                          
3
 Another measure of response rate could be obtained from the ratio of questionnaires that were returned to 
questionnaires that were sent to potential responding RBOs. Eighty-four questionnaires were sent and 27 were filled, 
which makes the response rate at 32 percent. 
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We conducted several principal component (PC) analyses in order to capture the information in 
these variables and to prevent possible multicollinearity, by combining a set of primary variables 
into one inclusive PC variable in our estimated relationships. Unfortunately, due to the quality of 
some of the variables in the dataset, the PC analysis did not yield meaningful results and could 
not be used in our analysis (see footnote 6). We also used several primary variables to create 
indices to reflect values that are better expressed on a relative rather than on an absolute scale, or 
to create dummies that capture key aspects of the decentralization process. 
4. The empirical framework 
We postulate that the characteristics of the decentralization process (P)
4
 and the level of the 
decentralization success/progress (S) can be estimated using a set of variables that include: 
contextual factors and initial conditions; characteristics of central government/basin-level 
relationships and capacities; internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements; and 
a set of “other” variables, identified as necessary. These groups of variables and their 
relationships were discussed in Blomquist et al. (2010) and Dinar et al. (2007), and will be used 
in our study as well. In addition, we use two new variables that have not been explicitly used in 
Dinar et al. (2007). One variable indicates whether or not the basin in question is governed by an 
international river basin organization, under an international treaty. International river basin 
organizations may include many tributary basins, and all constitute the international basin. The 
second variable measures the likely impact of climate change on precipitation or runoff in the 
river basin. The assumptions regarding the behavior of the various variables are provided in the 
following sections. 
We are interested in two types of relationships. The first is a relationship that explains a 
certain phenomenon in the basin, such as specifics of the decentralization process, measured by 
the levels of P. The second is a relationship that explains level of success/progress of the 
decentralization process, measured by S.  
The set of equations used in the estimation of the first relationship takes the following 
shape: 
[1] P =g(C, R, I | V, B, X) 
where: 
P is a vector of characteristics of the decentralization process; 
C is a vector of contextual factors and initial conditions; 
R is a vector of characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities; 
I is a vector of internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements; 
V represents the climatic conditions (precipitation or runoff) in the basin; 
B is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the basin is governed under an 
international river basin treaty/organization; and 
X is a vector of “other” variables, identified as necessary. 
                                                          
4
 Variables represented by a bold letter indicate a vector. 
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A general relationship for decentralization success/progress, using the theory developed 
above is as follows: 
[2]  S=f(C, P, R, I | V, B, X)  
where: 
S is a vector of performance indicators of the decentralization in the river basin.  
All other variables are as defined earlier.  
We have several measures of success and several measures for levels of progress of the 
decentralization process, as will be discussed in detail in coming sections. 
We propose several types of specification of the functional form depending on the nature 
of the variable S. Based on our discussion in previous sections, one possible way to measure 
success is by using a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 when decentralization was 
initiated and 0 when no decentralization took place in spite of government intent. 
A second way of describing success is to measure normatively the extent of achieving 
several important original goals of the decentralization reform. The success variable was 
computed as an aggregation of the success ratings over the different reported decentralization 
objectives, because the KMO-statistic
5
 of some individual success objective variables was very 
low. 
A third way of measuring progress of decentralization is by comparing performance 
between present and the pre-decentralization period. Performance variables may include: level of 
participation, local responsibility, financial performance, economic activity, etc. By comparing 
before and after values, we are just comparing change levels of each of the variables included in 
the comparison of before and after decentralization. 
4.1 Empirical specifications of the decentralization process and its performance 
The first specification of a relationship we investigate explains whether or not a decentralization 
process was initiated (equation 1). We expect that it takes some level of the contextual factors 
(C) as well as characteristics of the central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
(R) to initiate the decentralization. However, we are not sure about the direction of the impact of 
various internal configurations of basin-level institutional arrangements (I). Some existing water 
user associations may work in opposite directions. We expect that harsh climatic conditions (V) 
will be associated with higher likelihood of establishing river basin organization and existing 
international treaty or international river basin organization (B) that overrules the basin will help 
also in establishing the domestic RBO. We actually had to use the Linear Probability Model 
(LPM) approach because of the small number of observations. LPM is not bounded between zero 
and one, but still captures the intensity of the relationship between the binary dependent and the 
independent variables. 
Several variables could help shed light on the decentralization process. Few are probably 
of special interest as they contrast observations across river basin decentralization processes 
                                                          
5
 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic predicts if data are likely to factor well, based on correlation and partial 
correlation. The KMO overall statistic is used to decide whether or not to include a variable in the PC analysis. 
KMO overall should be .60 or higher to proceed with factor analysis. Variables with KMO statistic lower than 0.60 
should be dropped from the PC analysis. 
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under a variety of situations.
6
 The length of the decentralization process, Years Decentralization, 
the transaction costs of the process, measured by several variables such as Institutional 
Dismantled, Political Cost, and the level of involvement of the stakeholders, WUA Involvement, 
are a few that caught our attention. Estimation procedures explaining Intuitional Dismantled, 
Political Cost, and Years Decentralization use an OLS procedure as values of these variables are 
dummies or continuous. Table 4 summarizes the various equations we specified for relationship 
1 (equation 1), and the hypothesized directions of impact of the independent variables, based on 
the theory developed earlier. 
We identified several variables that serve to measure decentralization success or progress. 
The estimates of relationships using the first two approaches (that were mentioned earlier) to 
measuring success/progress imply LPM, TOBIT, and OLS estimation procedures. We use the 
variable Success over Objective (calculated as an aggregation of the success over all objectives) 
to reflect achievement of various goals the decentralization process was aimed to achieve. We 
applied LPM, TOBIT, and OLS procedure to estimate that relationship as well. Because we are 
not sure that the values measured are distributed normally, we cannot use GLM, as it may 
provide biased estimates. Thus we use the TOBIT procedure that assumes a Poisson distribution. 
Finally, we construct the additional variable, Problems After, to explain the performance of the 
decentralization process. Problems Before and Problems After are two variables for which we 
did use principal component. Table 5 summarizes the estimation procedures of the various 
equations we specified for estimating relationship 2 (equation 2), and the hypothesized directions 
of impact, based on the theory developed earlier. 
5. Results 
Our dataset includes a total of 27 RBOs in six countries distributed over two of the four SSA 
regions (four RBOs in two Eastern African countries and 23 RBOs in four Southern African 
countries). The other two regions in the continent, Central Africa and West Africa, do not have 
decentralization experiences or information about it is missing (Table 2). Our sample is quite 
well balanced, representing nearly 30 percent of the 14 eastern basins and 44 percent of the 23 
southern basins that underwent decentralization. We start with a report on the descriptive 
statistics of the variables participating in the analysis. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
While we based our entire analysis in this paper on the structure suggested in Dinar et al. (2007), 
due to the reasons indicated in Section 3 we had to revise the measurement of some of the 
variables and to eliminate several other variables that were not reported because of difficulties of 
the respondents in SSA basins to assign values to them. This shrunk the usable variables, and 
reduced the overall number of observations that we could include in the various estimated 
models. A detailed definition of the variables in our dataset can be found in Annex 2 and Annex 
3 (for the variables we created for this paper). The descriptive statistics of the variables that were 
included in this paper’s analysis is presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 demonstrates the problems in filling out the questionnaire, as the number of 
variables with full coverage of the entire set of observations fluctuates between 10 and 27. Of the 
available information, some of the descriptive statistics indicates that about 40 percent of the 
                                                          
6
 For definition of the variables see Annex 2 and 3. 
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basins were created through a bottom-up approach. In 80 percent of the basins that started the 
decentralization process, RBOs were created. In 58 percent of the basins, at least one institution 
was dismantled during the decentralization process. It is also clear that disputes over water 
scarcity seem to be more relevant than disputes over allocation. The decentralization process, on 
average, is about one decade old, ranging between two to 30 years. Decentralization processes in 
SSA started as early as 1979 and as late as 2009 (according to our sample). Finally, climate 
change may be impacting 76 percent of the basins through flow variation, and 68 percent of the 
basins in our sample are part of transboundary river, governed by international treaty. 
5.2 Inference of our hypotheses 
Following Dinar et al. (2007), we inferred our hypotheses regarding process and performance of 
the decentralization reform in SSA. Given the few countries in our database, we could not 
include state-level variables such as wealth, regime, and others. In addition, we lost several 
observations due to missing values of some of the variables involved. 
5.2.1 Performance of decentralization (before and after) 
We start by comparing several water management responsibility indicator items before and after 
the decentralization, using a two-tailed t-test. The results of the analysis of four activities (Water 
administration, infrastructure financing, water quality enforcement, and setting water quality 
standards) are presented in Table 7. 
As can be seen from Table 7, more water management activities at higher decentralized 
levels have been reported after the decentralization process, compared with the situation before 
the decentralization. With ranking of water activities varying between 1-5 (with 1 indicating 
centralized and 5 indicating most decentralized activity), one can see that there was a significant 
move of responsibilities towards basin-level and a significant reduction of responsibility at the 
central government (increase in local responsibility was not significant, and the same is true for 
increase in state responsibility). A significant increase of responsibilities towards basin-level was 
also reported in the case of infrastructure financing (increase in responsibility at local level and 
decrease in responsibility in state and central government levels were not significant). A 
significant increase in responsibility for water quality enforcement at the basin-level was 
reported (insignificant increase in local responsibility and insignificant decrease state and central 
government responsibilities were also reported). A significant increase in responsibility at the 
basin-level was reported for setting water quality standards (no significant changes have been 
reported for local, state, and central government). As a whole, our sample RBO moved after the 
decentralization process towards more responsibility at the basin-level for all four water 
management decision-making activities. At the same time these RBOs show a reduction in the 
central government responsibility in only water administration and water quality enforcement 
activities. Compared with Dinar et al. (2007), we introduced in this paper a category of local 
responsibility (mainly due to the very large size of the basins in SSA, compared to many of the 
basins in the study by Dinar et al. (2007). However, by 2013, there is still no progress towards 
increased responsibilities to the local communities, which suggests difficulty in implementing 
decentralization towards local actors. 
We were also able to get assessments of the severity levels of several issues the basins 
have been facing and to compare the situation before and after the decentralization. Ranking of 
severity before decentralization: no problem (0); some problem (1); severe problem (2). Ranking 
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of severity after decentralization: situation worsen (1); situation the same (0); situation improved 
(1). Means of these assessments for each problem item are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8 suggests that before decentralization, except for floods (with mean value of 
0.9545), all of the other issues were in the range of “some problem” to a “severe problem.” 
Water conflicts and development issues exhibit the highest level of severity in the sample basins. 
After decentralization, all the six issues have been either stable or improving, with floods, land 
degradation, and development issues being closer to 1, indicating that the situation related to 
these issues tended to improve on average. The situation remains on average the same for water 
scarcity, environmental problems, and water conflicts. 
5.2.2 Determinants of the decentralization process 
We use three decentralization process variables that allowed us to use most of the observations in 
the dataset. The results of the estimated equations are presented in Table 9. 
The results in Table 9 indicate very significantly that, regardless of the inclusion of the 
international treaty and the flow variation over time, all contextual factors included as well as the 
variables that measure the internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements, were 
significant and follow the expected sign, except the Creation Bottom Up variable. The 
coefficient of the Political Cost is positive and highly significant, suggesting that a higher 
political cost increases the water users involvement, and may lead to the creation of an RBO as a 
way to establish the new framework for a cooperative use of the resources. The negative sign on 
the coefficient on Creation Bottom Up, while opposite to our initial expectations and previous 
findings (Dinar et al. 2007) is in line with the anecdotal information provided in the introduction 
section and in Mutondo et al. (2014), suggesting that the WUAs that have been established in the 
RBOs were not well prepared to take off the decentralization process, lacking organizational, 
legal, and technical skills. This result may indicate that some central government involvement is 
still needed in SSA basins as a way to transfer not only responsibilities, but also skills to manage 
the resources under the decentralized arrangement. This support of the central government is 
needed so that the WUA’s creation and implementation process is not “manipulated” by 
dominant groups and therefore is neither equitable nor sustainable. More generally, this finding 
suggests that Creation Bottom Up is a necessary but not sufficient condition for institutional 
decentralization.  
Being under an International Treaty improves cooperation and raises the likelihood of an 
RBO being created and institutions (a water-related ministry) dismantled. At this point, it may 
seem that an international treaty that coordinates the various parts of the basin located in 
different countries may serve as a roadmap for a more effective decentralization, and a support 
tool for users to take the reins of the water resources management in a more stable and 
accountable setting.  
The variable Disputes over Allocation has a negative and significant coefficient in the 
equation explaining WUA Involvement, and a positive and significant coefficient in the equation 
explaining RBO Created. These results follow our expectations. They suggest that having 
insufficient dispute resolution mechanisms leads to disengagement of WUAs; however, it does 
provide impetus to the creation of the RBO. Indeed having water conflicts before the 
decentralization was indicated (Table 8) as the most severe problem. 
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Results for several water-scarcity variables are worth mentioning. Relative Water 
scarcity, Share of Surface Water, and Water Flow Fluctuates, all are significant and have a 
positive sign. This suggests that water scarcity in the range observed in our sample leads towards 
more involvement of the WUAs, more likelihood of creation of the RBO, and dismantling of 
existing institutions in the process of decentralization. 
5.2.3 The decentralization performance 
We were somehow limited in our ability to use the data on all variables that are expected to 
measure and explain decentralization performance. We remained with only two variables that 
measure performance, Success Over Objectives and Problems After Decentralization. The results 
of our regression analyses are presented in Table 10. 
Scrutiny of the results suggests that in spite of having a small number of observations, 
our model is of high explanatory level and significance. All coefficients are significant and with 
the expected sign, except for Water Flow Fluctuates and International Treaty, which are not 
significant. Adjusted R-squared ranges between 0.964 to 0.998, and F-test values are significant 
at 1 percent and less. The results indicate that higher Share of Surface Water, as well as a longer 
experience with the decentralization process (Years Decentralization) enhance the success over 
the basin's objectives. Lower levels of water scarcity, up to a point, may allow for an easier 
cooperation and coordination of the users, and for a faster accommodation of the decentralization 
arrangements. In other words, the absence of an acute problem around water availability 
facilitates conditions for coordination and a common approach towards basin solutions. A longer 
decentralization process may indicate the possibility of the establishment and learning of a 
cooperative behavior, and the stability of the mechanisms to solve disputes. All of that translates 
into a higher social capital accumulation. Contrary to the previous table, the political cost is 
highly significant and of a negative sign. It could be entirely possible that sharing the benefits of 
the decentralization process will result in an excessive level of political costs (through the 
changes of institutions or the imposition of new duties), which may offset any possible short-
term gain. Also, it is not because RBOs are created that problems are solved.  
Unlike the equations estimating the decentralization process characteristics, Creation 
Bottom Up has a positive impact on the performance of the decentralization. The fact that a 
higher-level Governing Body fosters the accomplishment of the objectives may be an indication 
of the need of the higher government levels to be active and supportive during the 
decentralization process. Having a higher Budget Per Capita is an important factor in having less 
Problems After Decentralization, which is an important finding with policy implications. Some 
other coefficients deserve additional discussion because their coefficients are different in the 
decentralization process equation (Table 9) and in the decentralization performance equations 
(Table 10), which was expected, based on our theoretical framework (Tables 4 and 5). Political 
Cost has a positive sign in the process equations, and a negative sign in the performance 
equation; Creation Bottom Up has a (surprising, but justifiable) negative sign in the process 
equation, and a positive sign in the performance equation; and Years Decentralization has a 
negative sign in the process equation and a positive sign in the performance equation. 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
Decentralization efforts in river basins have been seen around the world under various political 
and institutional situations. African river basins have been joining the decentralization process of 
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river basins relatively late, initiating the process somewhere in early 1990s. We modified and 
applied an analytical framework that was originally used in a previous study outside of Sub-
Saharan Africa. The dataset we were able to collect consists of about 40 percent of the river 
basins in SSA that initiated decentralization. We conclude that the analytical framework of water 
management decentralization we used is robust enough to explain the decentralization process 
and progress even in the presence of a limited sample. It seems that this framework, when used 
with a richer dataset and over a longer period of time can be informative to policy makers when 
designing and evaluating decentralization processes in Africa and other parts of the world. 
Some of the variables in our analysis have interesting implications. It appears that the 
success and stability of the decentralization process depends on the way the new framework 
distributes the Political Cost and compensates those who carried its burden. As for the Method of 
Creation, it seems that a grass-root initiative, despite all the benefits it may capture in terms of 
legitimacy and use of pre-existing community arrangements is insufficient if not properly 
supported by government transfers of skills, or know how, budget responsibilities and technical 
knowledge. The similar impact of WUAs Involvement amplifies that conclusion. For SSA this 
conclusion is probably the most relevant one, with policy implications. Training the WUAs prior 
to the initiation of the decentralization process is essential for high efficacy of the 
decentralization. Otherwise the social investment in institutional reforms in the water sector 
would be wasted. It should be mentioned here that the results of the variables Method of 
Creation, Creation Bottom-Up, and WUAs Involvement, in a previous study with similar 
analytical framework applied to regions other than SSA were the opposite, suggesting that in 
SSA grass-root efforts have to still be nourished. 
Interpreting the opposite signs of the coefficients of major variables that are included in 
estimates of decentralization process and performance equations (Creation Bottom-Up, Political 
Cost, Years Decentralization) could mean that while the implementation of decentralization 
processes in the water sector in SSA does not guarantee success, on the other hand, factors that 
improve the performance of decentralization do not necessarily facilitate its implementation. For 
example, in progress decentralization institutions can have better results than established RBOs 
suffering from untrained staff and malperformance of infrastructure as well as being 
disconnected from the stakeholders. 
It also appears that the best performances of decentralized basins seem to refer to 
solutions for infrastructural problems (floods, and land degradation control), while the socio-
economic problems, perceived before decentralization (conflicts, development), have been 
addressed less frequently. This result could be a consequence of the fact that hardware solutions 
(infrastructure, engineering) are easier to implement than software solutions (stakeholders’ 
participation, dispute resolution forums, etc.). Another interpretation of this last observation is 
associated with the previously mentioned context that infrastructure could be built by 
international companies, but when completed and left with local operators, may not function well 
due to inadequate institutions and preparedness.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Initial set of identified river basins in SSA by region. 
Region Number of reported 
river basins 
Southern Africa 34 
West Africa 30 
Central Africa 14 
East Africa 21 
Total 99 
Source: ANBO AMCOW and GTZ, 2012. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of decentralization efforts in various regions of SSA 
Country 
Basins with 
decentralization 
undertaken 
Basins with 
decentralization 
in progress  
Basins with no 
decentralization 
Basin with no 
information 
about 
decentralization 
Southern Africa Region 
Angola   7  
Botswana   4  
Lesotho   1  
Madagascar   4  
Mozambique
7
 13    
Namibia  10   
South Africa 2 17   
Swaziland 1 2   
Zambia   3  
Zimbabwe 7    
Subtotal 23 29 19 0 
West Africa Region 
Ivory Coast    1 
Benin    1 
Liberia    1 
Cameroon    2 
Ghana   4  
Guinée    1 
Mali    1 
Mauritania    1 
                                                          
7
 Mozambican respondents to our survey indicated that RBOs in that country are established. Compared to the level 
of development of the RBOs of other African countries, it would probably be more correct to put Mozambican 
RBOs in the second column, where water decentralization process is “in progress.” However, to reflect precisely the 
survey results, we decided to leave the Mozambican RBOs in the first column. 
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Nigeria    1 
Senegal    1 
Subtotal 0 0 4 10 
Central African 
Republic 
   1 
DR Congo   4 4 
Equatorial Guinea    1 
Gabon    2 
Subtotal 0 0 4 8 
East Africa Region 
Ethiopia    4 
Kenya  5   
Malawi   1  
Sudan    4 
Tanzania 9    
Uganda   1  
Subtotal 9 5 2 8 
Central Africa Region 
Central African 
Republic 
   1 
Democratic Republic 
Congo 
  4 4 
Equatorial Guinea    1 
Gabon   1 1 
Subtotal 0 0 6 8 
Total  32 34 29 26 
Source: Modified from PEGASYS, 2013. 
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Table 3: Details about the basins included in our analysis 
 
Basins with 
decentralization 
undertaken 
Basins with 
decentralization 
in progress  
Basins 
in 
Sample 
Names of basins included 
Mozambique 13  5 
Limpopo, Inkomati, Buzi, 
Save, Pungwe 
Kenya  5 1 Lake Victoria 
South Africa 2 17 10 
Breede-Overberg, Incomati, 
Olifants/Letaba, Middle 
Vaal, Upper Orange, 
Crocodile, Usuthu, Thukela, 
Mvoti, Limpopo 
Swaziland 1 2 2 Komati, Usuthu 
Zimbabwe 7  6 
Gwayi, Limpopo, Save, 
Sanyati, Manyame, Mazowe, 
Tanzania 9  3 
Rufuji, Wami/Ruvu, Internal 
Drainage 
Total in sample 30 26 27  
Total in region 
(Table 2) 
30 36 N/A N/A 
Note: While some similar basin names can be found in different countries, each represent a different RBO, with no 
physical or institutional interaction between these RBOs. 
 
Table 4: Decentralization process 
Dependent Var. 
  
Independent Var. 
WUAs Involvement RBO Created Institutions 
Dismantled 
Budget per Capita NI NI NI 
Creation Bottom-Up + + + 
Disputes over allocation - + NI 
Governing Body NI NI NI 
International Treaty + + + 
Political Cost + + + 
Relative water scarcity NI + + 
Share of surface water NI NI + 
Water flow fluctuates NI NI + 
WUA Involvement NI NI NI 
Years Decentralization - NI NI 
NI=Not included 
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Table 5: Decentralization performance 
 Dependent Var. 
 
 
Independent Var. 
Success over Objectives Problems after Decentralization 
Budget Per Capita NI + 
Creation Bottom Up  + 
Disputes over Allocation NI NI 
Governing Body + NI 
Institutions Dismantled NI NI 
International Treaty + NI 
Political Cost - - 
RBO Created NI NI 
Relative Water Scarcity NI NI 
Share of SW +/- NI 
Water Flow Fluctuates - NI 
WUA Involvement NI NI 
Years Decentralization + NI 
NI=Not included 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
River basin part of an international basin 25 0.68 0.4760 0 1 
Does water flow in basin fluctuates across 
the year 
25 0.76 0.4358 0 1 
River basin resources equitably distributed 25 0.16 0.3741 0 1 
Budget per capita 17 6.6131 15.7686 0.1785 66.4250 
Forum to solve dispute 23 1.0869 0.4170 0 2 
Governing Body 22 4 1.661 1 6 
Method of Creation 27 1.5925 0.5007 1 2 
Creation Bottom-Up 27 0.4074 0.5007 0 1 
Creation Top-Down 27 0.5925 0.5007 0 1 
Existence of political cost 25 3.56 1.3868 0 5 
Relative water scarcity 17 0.5230 0.3308 0.0864 1.5 
Share surface water 23 4.4781 0.9472 1 5 
Water Users Association involvement 24 1.6666 1.007 1 5 
Year of creation 18 1999 7.3163 1979 2009 
Years of decentralization 23 9.4782 6.4938 2 30 
RBO created 25 0.800 0.4082 0 1 
Institutions dismantled 17 0.5882 0.5072 0 1 
Disputes over quality 23 0.5217 0.5107 0 1 
Disputes over allocation 23 0.3478 0.4869 0 1 
Problems before decentralization (PC 
variable) 
15 2.41e-09 0.9482 -2.3690 2.4236 
Problems after the decentralization (PC 
variable) 
10 -1.34e-08 0.9765 -1.1872 1.3384 
Success over objectives (redefined) 16 5.4375 1.6720 3 9 
Note: The two PC variables, Problems before decentralization and Problem after decentralization 
can yield negative values at the lowest range. 
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Table 7: Decision-making in water management at various levels before and after 
decentralization 
Activity Before After t-Statistic 
Water Administration 
Local  2.235 2.692 0.8785 
Basin 1.611 3.733 6.0498*** 
State 2.875 3.125 0.3369 
Central Government 3.950 2.533 -2.7947*** 
Infrastructure Financing 
Local  1.917 2.400 0.9659 
Basin 1.286 2.714 2.4019** 
State 3.222 3.125 -0.1453 
Central Government 4.714 4.667 -0.1166 
Water Quality Enforcement 
Local  1.500 1.800 0.7069 
Basin 1.529 3.273 3.7063*** 
State 2.750 2.500 -0.4229 
Central Government 4.000 3.286 -1.8609* 
Setting Water Quality Standards 
Local  1.200 1.000 -0.5311 
Basin 1.333 2.333 2.3094** 
State 2.083 2.714 0.9073 
Central Government 4.600 4.571 -0.1031 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
 
Table 8: Changes in severity of various water management issue between before and after 
decentralization 
Problem Item Before After t-Statistic 
Floods 0.9545 0.7222 1.5396+ 
Water Scarcity 1.0952 0.4705 3.6246*** 
Environmental Quality 1.1052 0.2666 3.5794*** 
Water Conflicts 1.3888 0.2666 4.5825*** 
Land Degradation  1.0500 0.7500 1.6771* 
Development Issues 1.3333 0.6153 3.5257** 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.15. We included also coefficients with level of significance of 15 
percent to accommodate results that are influenced by the small number of observations. 
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Table 9: Estimated features of the decentralization process  
Estimation 
procedure 
OLS OLS LPM LPM LPM 
Explanatory 
Variable 
WUAs 
Involvement 
WUAs 
Involvement 
RBO 
Created 
RBO 
Created 
Institutions 
Dismantled 
Political Cost 
1.1071 
(4.41)*** 
1.1068 
(5.00)*** 
0.4717 
(3.32)** 
0.5731 
(4.79)*** 
0.2062 
(4.04)** 
Creation 
Bottom-Up 
-1.0336 
(2.19)* 
-1.1089 
(2.61)** 
-0.2495 
(3.36)** 
-0.3075 
(4.90)*** 
-0.0859 
(7.99)** 
Years 
Decentralization 
-0.3671 
(5.11)*** 
-0.36361 
(5.73)***    
Disputes over 
allocation 
-1.0308 
(2.23)** 
-0.8469 
(1.98)* 
0.4499 
(3.22)** 
0.7309 
(4.67)*** 
 
Relative water 
scarcity  
 0.9017 
(3.16)** 
1.1600 
(4.84)*** 
0.9306 
(14.08)*** 
Share of surface 
water  
 
  
0.1589 
(13.30)*** 
International 
Treaty  
0.7457 
(1.78)+ 
 0.2751 
(1.99)+ 
0.1759 
(5.20)** 
Water flow 
fluctuates   
 
 
0.7785 
(11.71)*** 
Constant 
1.6701 
3.03 
1.0635 
(1.75)+ 
0.8078 
(2.97)** 
0.5119 
(2.15)* 
-0.7899 
(9.10)** 
Number of obs 16 14 11 10 9 
F-test 7.42 6.83 5.18 8.4 285.08 
Prob > F 0.0038 0.0091 0.0377 0.0302 0.0035 
R-squared 0.7295 0.8103 0.7754 0.9131 0.9988 
Adj R-squared 0.6312 0.6918 0.6257 0.8045 0.9953 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. + significant at 15%,* significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5% , *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 10: Estimated decentralization performance equations 
Estimation 
procedure 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent Variable 
Success over 
Objectives 
Success over 
Objectives 
Success over 
Objectives 
Problems after 
Decentralization 
Share of surface 
water 
0.5967 
(3.39)** 
0.5868 
(10.37)*** 
0.5931 
(9.74)*** 
 
Years 
Decentralization 
0.1928 
(3.18)** 
0.1395 
(6.31)*** 
0.1450 
(6.21)*** 
 
Political Cost  
-1.1042 
(7.38)*** 
-1.0192 
(20.25)*** 
-1.0093 
(16.80)*** 
-1.0715 
(8.50)*** 
Governing Body 
0.9838 
(6.18)*** 
0.9541 
(18.72)*** 
0.9483 
(15.83)*** 
 
Creation Bottom Up 
   
7.2967 
(8.04)*** 
Budget per Capita 
   
0.9797 
(7.79)*** 
Water Flow 
Fluctuates 
 -0.1080 
(0.75) 
  
International Treaty 
 
 
-0.0120 
(0.10) 
 
Constant 
1.6087 
(1.2) 
2.1236 
(4.37)** 
1.9694 
(4.02)** 
-3.6314 
(5.31)*** 
Number of obs 10 9 9 7 
F-test 33.71 276.39 233.62 26.84 
Prob > F 0.0008 0.0003 0.0004 0.0114 
R-squared 0.9642 0.9978 0.9974 0.9641 
Adj R-squared 0.9356 0.9942 0.9932 0.9282 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. + significant at 15%,* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% , 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Annex 1: The final RBOs included in the analysis 
River basin organization Country 
Lake Victoria Kenya 
Ara Sul Limpopo Mozambique 
Ara Centro Buzi Mozambique 
Ara Centor Pungue Mozambique 
Ara Centro Save Mozambique 
Ara Sul Inkomati Mozambique 
Komati River Basin Authority Swaziland 
Usuthu River Basin Authority Swaziland 
Breede Overberg Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Inkomati Usuthu Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Crocodile West Marico Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Upper Orange Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Mvoti to Umzimkulu Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Middle Vaal Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Tukela Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Usutu to Mhaltuze Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Olifants Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Limpopo Proto Catchment Management Agency South Africa 
Rufiji Basin Water Board  Tanzania 
Wami Ruvu Basin Water Board Tanzania 
Internal Drainage Basin Water Board Tanzania 
Gwayi Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Manyame Catchment Council  Zimbabwe 
Mazowe Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Mzingwana Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Sanyati Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Save Catchment Council Zimbabwe 
Source: PEGASYS (2013:33). 
  
 Annex 2: Original variables in the dataset and construction of other  
Name of the Variable Definition Categories 
1.barea area of river basin in square km  
2.ptotal total population in the river basin  
3.%rural  percentage rural population in the 
river basin  
 
4.precipation annual precipitation / rainfall in mm 1=100mm-200mm, 
2=300mm-400mm, 
3=500mm-600mm, 
4=700mm-800mm, 
5=900-100, 6=1000-
1100, 7=1200-1300, 
8=1400-1500, 9= 1600-
1700, 10= 1800-1900, 
11= 2000-2100, 12= 
2200-2300, 13= 2400-
2500, 14= 2600-2700, 
15= 2800-2900  
4.evapotransp annual evapotranspiration in mm 1=100mm-200mm, 
2=300mm-400mm, 
3=500mm-600mm, 
4=700mm-800mm, 
5=900-100, 6=1000-
1100, 7=1200-1300, 
8=1400-1500, 9= 1600-
1700, 10= 1800-1900, 
11= 2000-2100, 12= 
2200-2300, 13= 2400-
2500, 14= 2600-2700, 
15= 2800-2900  
5.wresources river basin water resources in million 
cubic meters p/y 
 
6.countriesshare number of countries sharing river 
basin  
 
7.iyeadecentr period over which decentralization 
occurred in years 
 
8.iyearrbo year of creation of river basin   
9.iobjectwaterconflict water conflict as RBO objective  0 = No, 1 = Yes 
9.iobjectflood flood control as RBO objective  0 = No, 1 = Yes 
9.iobjectwaterscarcity water scarcity as RBO objective  0 = No, 1 = Yes 
9.iobjectothers1,2,3, other objective 0= n/a,1 = pollution,2 = 
water resources 
management,3 = water 
quality,4 = hydropower,5 
= planning,6 = 
stabilization of aquifer,7 
= conservation,8 = water 
allocation/ distributiion,9 
= development 
 2 
schemes,10 = public 
awareness,11 = resource 
evaluation,12 = 
maintenance,13 = water 
management education,14 
= hydrological work,15 = 
sanitation and water 
supply,16 = watershed 
conservation,17 = 
improve efficiency,18 = 
navigation,19 = flood 
control,20 = water 
scarcity,21 = water 
conflicts,22 = water 
utilization,23 = 
recreation,24 = dam 
safety,25 = river 
administration  
10.ifloodscale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
10.iwaterscarcescale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
10.iwaterconflictscale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
10.iother1scale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
10.iother2scale measurement of success against 
objectives 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
11.ibody governing body of river basin 
organsiation 
0 = “N/A”,1 = 
“Federal”,2 = “State 
Authority”’3 = “State 
owned company”,4 = 
“Regional Authority”,5 = 
“Regional 
Board/Council/Committe
e”, 6=3 and 5 
12.igover-body-selct  selection process of governing body 
of the river basin - Nominated 
1= ‘N/A’ 2= ‘Federal 
Government’ 3= ‘State’ 
4= ‘Local Government’ 
 3 
5= ‘Users 
12.igover-body-selct  selection process of governing body 
of the river basin - Appointed 
1= ‘N/A’ 2= ‘Federal 
Government’ 3= ‘State’ 
4= ‘Local Government’ 
5= ‘Users 
12.igover-body-selct  selection process of governing body 
of the river basin - Designated 
1= ‘N/A’ 2= ‘Federal 
Government’ 3= ‘State’ 
4= ‘Local Government’ 
5= ‘Users 
14.icreationrbo method of RBO creation  0 = “N/A”,1 = Bottom-
up”,2 = Top-Down 
15.iinstdismantled institutions dismantled in 
decentralization process 
0 = n/a, 1= Ministry/ 
Department of Water, 2= 
Irrigation Boards, 3= 
Regional Water 
Authority, 4= Local 
Authority, 5= River 
boards, 6= 
Administration court, 7= 
UDAH 
16.iinewinstitution  new institutions that had to be created 
in decentralization process 
0 = n/a, 1= Ministry/ 
Department of Water, 2= 
Irrigation Boards, 3= 
Regional Water 
Authority, 4= Local 
Authority, 5= RBO/ water 
user associations/ 
catchment council 
17.icostdecentinstitutions cost of the decentralization process  0 = none, 1=low, 2=low 
medium 3=medium, 
4=medium high, 5=high  
18.iforumsyesno do forums exist for hearing disputes  0 = No, 1 = Yes 
19.iissuesresolved main types of disputes/issues that 
usually need resolving 
0= n/a, 1= water quality, 
2=waste disposal, 3= 
deforestation, 4=erosion, 
5=agricultural practices, 
6=basin infrastructure, 
7=ground water pollution, 
8= floods, 9= water 
allocation, 10= Siltation, 
11= water use/ 
legal/illegal, 12= All, 
13=1-2-5 
20.iwaterassociations degree of involvement of water user 
associations  
0= n/a,1 = 0%, 2=25%, 
3= 50%, 4= 75%, 5= 
100% 
 4 
20.iwaterassociationsyesno have water user associations been 
established  
0 = No, 1 = Yes 
21.itypesinfrustcanal quantity of canals in the basin   
before   
25.indprobbfloods level of flooding problems before 
establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe 
problem 
25.indprobbwaterscarcity  level of water scarcity problems 
before establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe 
problem 
25.indprobbenvquality level of environmental quality 
problems before establishment of 
RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe 
problem 
25.indprobbwaterconflicts level of water conflict problems 
before establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe 
problem 
25.indprobblanddegrad level of land degradation problems 
before establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe 
problem 
25.indprobbdevelpissues level of problems with development 
issues before establishment of RBO  
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe 
problem 
25.othername other problems (before and after) the 
establishment of RBO 
0 = n/a,1 = water mgt 
issues and authority 
crises,2 = Env. 
Awareness,3 = 
Organization,4 = 
Hydropower,5 = Water 
Supply,6 = Drought  
25.indprobbother level of other problems before 
establishment of RBO 
1 = no response,2 = no 
problem,3 = some 
problem,4 = severe 
problem  
after   
25.indprobafloods level of flooding problems after 
establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 
= situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbwaterscarcity  level of water scarcity problems after 
establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 
= situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbenvquality level of environmental quality 
problems after establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 
= situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbwaterconflicts level of water conflict problems after -1 = situation worsened, 0 
 5 
establishment of RBO = situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobblanddegrad level of land degradation problems 
after establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 
= situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbdevelpissues level of problems with development 
issues after establishment of RBO  
-1 = situation worsened, 0 
= situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
25.indprobbother level of other problems after 
establishment of RBO 
-1 = situation worsened, 0 
= situation the same, 1 = 
situation improved 
   
26.iadmblocal percentage of water administration 
decision making at local level before 
RBO 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iadmbbasin percentage of water administration 
decision making at basin level before 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iadmbstate percentage of water administration 
decision making at state level before 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iadmbgov  percentage of water administration 
decision making at government level 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ifinblocal percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the local level 
before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ifinbbasin percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the basin level 
before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ifinbstate percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the state level 
before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ifinbgov percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the government 
level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ienfblocal percentage of water quality 
enforcement decision making at the 
local level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ienfbbasin percentage of water quality 
enforcement decision making at the 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
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basin level before RBO  60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ienfbstate  percentage of water quality 
enforcement decision making at the 
state level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ienfbgov percentage of water quality 
enforcement decision making at the 
government level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.istdsblocal percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at 
the local level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.istdsbbasin percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at 
the basin level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.istdsbstate percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at 
the state level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.istdsbgov percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at 
the government level before RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iotherblocal26 percentage of decision making for 
other responsibilities at the local 
level before the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iotherbbasin26 percentage of decision making for 
other responsibilities at the basin 
level before the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iotherbstate26 percentage of decision making for 
other responsibilities at the state level 
before the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iotherbgov26 percentage of decision making for 
other responsibilities at the 
government level before the creation 
of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
   
26.iadmalocal percentage of water administration 
decision making at the local level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iadmabasin percentage of water administration 
decision making at the basin level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
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100%  
26.iadmastate percentage of water administration 
decision making at the state level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iadmagov  percentage of water administration 
decision making at the government 
level after the creation of RBO 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ifinalocal percentage of water administration 
decision making at the local level 
after the creation of RBO 
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ifinabasin percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the basin level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ifinastate percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the state level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ifinagov percentage of infrastructure financing 
decision making at the government 
level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ienfalocal percentage of water quality 
enforcement decision making at the 
local level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ienfabasin percentage of water quality 
enforcement decision making at the 
basin level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ienfastate percentage of water quality 
enforcement decision making at the 
state level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.ienfagov percentage of water quality 
enforcement decision making at the 
government level after the creation of 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.istdsalocal percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at 
the local level after the creation of 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.istdsabasin percentage of the setting of water 
quality standards decision making at 
the basin level after the creation of 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.istdsastate percentage of the setting of water 1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
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quality standards decision making at 
the state level after the creation of 
RBO  
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.istdsagov percentage of decision making on 
setting of water quality standards at 
the government level after creation of 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iothername  other responsibilities  1 = Quality objectives,2 = 
Operation and 
Maintenance, 3 = 
Management, 4 = 
Planning,5 = Water 
Supply 
26.iotheralocal percentage of the decision making for 
other responsibilities at the local 
level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iotherabasin percentage of the decision making for 
other responsibilities at the basin 
level after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iotherastate percentage of the decision making for 
other responsibilities at the state level 
after the creation of RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
26.iotheragov percentage of the decision making for 
other responsibilities at the 
government level after the creation of 
RBO  
1 = 0%-19%, 2 = 20%-
39%, 3 = 40%-59%, 4 = 
60%-79%, 5 = 80%-
100%  
27.wrmibwatertypes water rights after RBO existence  0 = None,1 = Permanent 
Rights,2 = Long-Term 
use concession (> 10 
yrs),3 = Short-Term use 
concession (<10 yrs),4 = 
Permanent Transferable,5 
= Permanent non-
transferable 
28.wrmibresponsiblerigths responsibility for awarding water 
rights before RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 
= Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
29.wrmibresponsibleallocati
on 
responsibility for water allocation 
before RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 
= Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
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30.wrmibresponsiblemodfor
e 
responsibility for modeling and 
forecasting water availability before 
RBO existence  
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 
= Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
31.wrmibresponsiblemonit responsibility for monitoring and 
enforcement of water quality before 
RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 
= Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
32.wrmiaresponsibletariff responsibility for collecting tariffs 
after RBO existence 
0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = 
National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 
= Local Government,6 = 
River Basin Organization 
53.part-intl-bsn-treaty  river basin part of an international 
basin 
0 = No, 1 = Yes 
54.flow-var-flact-overtime  does water flow in basin fluctuate 
across the year 
0 = No, 1 = Yes 
55.res-dist-equal-bfor-
decentr  
river resources equitably distributed 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
56.bfor-ben-2-gov  who benefited most before rbo 1 = federal government, 2 
= local leaders, 3= 
commercial farmers, 4 = 
small farmers 
57.res-dist-equal-aftr-
decentr  
basin resources equitably distributed 
after RBO 
0 = No, 1 = Yes 
58.ftr-ben-2-gov  who benefited most after rbo 1 = federal government, 2 
= local leaders, 3= 
commercial farmers, 4 = 
small farmers 
 Annex 3: Definition of created variables 
Name of the 
Variable 
Definition Categories 
budgetbas  Budget of the basin  
budgetextra  Share budget of the basin allocated by 
external agency 
 
budgetperca  The budget of the basin in per capita 
terms 
 
formsdispute2  Existence of dispute resolution 
institutions 
 
governbody  Governing body of the RBO Higher values express more centralization: 5=Federal, 4=State 
Authority, 3=State owned company, 2=Regional Authority and 
1=Regional Board/ Council/Committee 
methodcrea  The way the RBO was created N/A = 0, Bottom Up = 1, and Top Down = 2 
methodbottom  If the RBO was a Bottom-Up creation 1 = Bottom-Up creation, 0 = otherwise 
methodtop  if the RBO was a Top-Down creation 1 = Top-Down, 0 = otherwise 
polcost  The political cost of the decentralization 
process via the creation of new 
institutions 
0 = none, 1=low, 2=medium low, 3=medium, 4=medium high, 
5=high  
popdensity  Number of people per square kilometer 
(ratio inhabitants to basin area) 
 
scarcity1  The ratio between rainfall and 
evapotranspiration 
 
sharesw  The share of surface water in the 
available water resources in the basin 
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wuainvol  The degree of WUA involvement and 
participation 
 
yearcreation  The year in which the RBO was created  
yearsdecen  The length of the decentralization 
process 
 
budgetspent  Variable for budget spent in the basin fbudgetinvestmentbasin+fbudgetotheractivities+fbudgetom+fbudget
waterquality+fbudgetother 
inscreatedrbo  dummy if it is a RBO/Water User 
Association/Catchment Council is 
created 
1 = RBO/Water User Association/Catchment Council, 0 = otherwise 
insdismantmin  dummy if a Ministry/Water Department 
was dismantled 
1 = Ministry/Water Department was dismantled, 0 = Otherwise 
dispquality  dummy variable for quality issues 1 = water quality or waste disposal, 0 = Otherwise 
dispallocation  dummy variable for allocation issues 1 = water allocation or water use/ legal/illegal, 0 = otherwise 
budgetsrcs  budget sources Share of external agency plus share from stakeholders plus share 
from other sources 
budgetsrcspc  budget sources computed by Principal 
components 
principal components of budget from external agency, stakeholders 
and other sources 
budgetagency  Share of budget sources from external 
agency 
 
budgetstake  share of budget from stakeholders  
usergroup  Variable for the Existence of user 
groups computed by principal 
components 
The components are calculated from wrmiusersgroup1 
wrmiusersgroup2 wrmiusersgroup3 
improvedresp  Improved responsibility computed as a 
principal component as differences 
Before and after variables on water rights, allocation, monitoring, 
forecasting and collecting tariffs as defined in the original dataset 
 3 
between before and after 
increimprovement  incremental improvement variable 
computed by principal component from 
before and after 
Flooding, scarcity, environmental quality, conflict, land degradation, 
development issues before and after the RBO 
incretasks  incremental tasks computed as a 
principal component variable 
Water administration, infrastructure financing, quality enforcement 
and standards setting before and after the RBO  
problembefore  problems before decentralization 
computed by a principal component  
Floods, water scarcity, environmental quality, water conflicts, land 
degradation and development issues before the RBO 
problemafter  problems after the decentralization 
computed by a principal component 
Floods, water scarcity, environmental quality, water conflicts, land 
degradation and development issues after the RBO 
sectorshare  Sector Use Shares computed as a 
principal component 
existence of irrigation, industrial, domestic, hydropower and 
environmental uses/applications water users in the basin  
successobjective  Success over Objectives computed as a 
principal component 
scale of success over floodscale, water scarcity, water conflict, other 
objective1 and other objective2 
userspaying  Variable for Users' Pay computed as a 
principal component 
percentage of irrigation, industry users who pay tariff and domestic 
users paying tariff  
budgetspent1  budget spent computed as an 
aggregation 
development, investment and water quality budget 
maxsector  Maximum number of sectors in the 
RBO 
existence of irrigation, industrial, domestic hydropower 
environmental uses/applications in the basin  
allsector  dummy variable if the basin has all 
sector 
1 = all sector, 0 = otherwise 
goodallsuccess  aggregation of the success on floods, 
scarcity and water problems 
aggregation of the success on floods, scarcity and water problems 
userspayadd Aggregation of the users' groups paying 
the tariff 
irrigation, industry users and domestic users paying the tariff  
   
 
